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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RAYMOND GLENN DODGE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 14242 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal action charging appellant 
with the offense of Aggravated Robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict 
of guilty to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, the 
defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and 
a judgment of acquittal in his favor as a matter of law. 
In the alternative, appellant would seek to have the 
judgment set aside and be granted a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was tried jointly with two other defen-
dants , Diane Jewell Lobato and Lawrence Arthur Morgan. A 
Motion for mistrial was granted as to defendant Lobato 
near the conclusion of trial proceedings. Defendant Morgan 
was found guilty by jury verdict of Aggravated Robbery. 
The robbery charges stem from incidents occurring 
at the Ming Restaurant in Granger, Utah, during the early 
hours of June 11, 1975, The prosecution's evidence con-
sisted of the testimony of six witnesses and the introduction 
of the prosecution's case, and subsequent to its opening 
statement, the six prosecution witnesses were sworn, were 
instructed to wait outside of the courtroom to testify 
until called pursuant to the exclusion rule, and were 
admonished not to discuss the case while waiting outside 
during the trial, both before and after giving testimony. 
The oath of testimony, instruction as to the exclusion 
rule, and admonition not to discuss the case was each 
administered by the court (Record, p. 65, In. 25 to 
p. 66, In. 14) pursuant to request by defense counsel. 
The first witness was Rhea Selvadge, the cashier 
at the restaurant and victim of the holdup. In her testi-
mony (Record, p. 66-93), she identified defendant Morgan 
as the perpetrator of the offense and claimed the amount 
taken was $582. She did not identify defendant Dodge, 
but referred to "another gentleman" who entered the 
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restaurant while the holdup was in process, told defendant 
Morgan "hurry," and helped carry the money out (p. 69, 
In. 18 to p. 70, In. 3). She was able to describe the 
second person as male, white, but dark colored with 
extremely dark hair, five feet eight inches tall, and 
150 pounds (p. 70, In. 28 to p. 71, In. 9, p. 87, In. 
13-20). She was unable to describe the clothing worn by 
the second man (p. 78, In. 17-26, p. 81, In. 29 to p. 82, 
In. 4), but noticed that he was nervous (p. 79, In. 
19-22) , and was standing "as close as he could possibly 
get" to defendant Morgan (p. 80, In. 7 to p. 81, In. 1, 
p. 86, In. 27-29, p. 87, In. 2-12) for approximately 20 
seconds. She also mentioned that "one of the gentlemen" 
wore wire rim glasses (p. 82, In. 16-19, p. 87, In. 21-25, 
p. 88, In. 4-7, 15-16), but was not sure as to which one. 
She did not detect the second man to be armed (p. 86, In. 
30 to p. 87, In. 1). She did not see either man leave 
the restaurant (p. 88, In. 17-29), nor did she see either 
of them again that night. 
The court recessed for lunch after witness 
Selvadge's testimony. It reconvened after lunch in 
chambers, where counsel moved the court to grant a mis-
trial on the basis of misconduct by the prosecution's 
witnesses. The misconduct consisted of all of the State's 
witnesses freely and openly discussing their testimony 
together, which was observed by defense counsel (Record, 
p. 94, In. 16-27). Matters discussed which were overheard Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by defense counsel included identification, eyeglasses and 
time (p. 94, In. 21-27; p. 95, In. 3-7, In. 26-28). Such 
discussions had been expressly forbidden by the court in 
its previous admonition to the witnesses after taking the 
oath of testimony. The motion was argued to the court 
by respective counsel (p. 94-100), and was taken under 
advisement by the court. After the State rested its case, 
the motion was renewed and argued (p. 187-190), and again 
taken under advisement. The court later denied the motion 
(p. 196, In. 5-7). 
The second witness was Donna Lynn Shortino, a 
waitress working at the Ming Restaurant during the com-
mission of the holdup. She testified that she informed 
Ned Frandson of the holdup and that they went outside the 
restaurant (Record, p. 102, In. 6-11) . She stated her 
observation of a gold car pulling out of the driveway 
(p. 102, In. 12 to p. 103, In. 1), the driver of the car 
(p. 107, In. 21-25), and "possibly two" head shadows 
(p. 108, In. 2-14), but was unable to make any identification. 
She admitted that the prosecution witnesses discussed the 
case together during the noon recess (p. 109, In. 25 to 
p. 110, In. 6), including witness Selvadge, who had already 
testified. 
The third witness was Ned M. Frandson, a Salt 
Lake County Deputy Sheriff, who was at the cafe having 
coffee while off duty (Record, p. 110, In. 26 to p. Ill, In.5). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
He testified that he had a conversation with witness Shortino, 
went outside of the restaurant . . . 11, In. 6- 18) , and 
observed three moving cars in the parking lot (p. 131 , 1 r 
22 to p. 1 12, li: :i 5). His at tent ion was drawn to one of 
the three cars, which he described as brown or gold, medium 
sized, with square taillights (p. 112, In. 6-25). He 
stated that his description of the car was broadcast over 
a police radio report, which later included a description 
o £ three suspec t s : (1) Wh i te ma 1 e Amer Ic an, 6 f 2" 3 0 - 3 2 
years, blond hair, collar length, blond mustache, brown 
jacket a nd si acks; (2) white male American, 5 f 10-11", 
approximately 30-32 years, dark hair; and (3) woman, 
no basic description (p. 112, In. 26 to p. 113, In. 2 3 ) . 
He claimed to have obtained the descriptions from Sherry 
Snyder and Gayle Llewelyn after he had left the restaurant 
(p. 11 S, ,! n 1 3 i .o p. 116, In , 18) . He, too, submitted 
that the witnesses discussed the case together during the 
noon recess (p. 119, In. 2-24). 
The fourth wi tness was S A. Twitchell * . -i 
also a Sal t Lake County Deputy Sheriff, who was on dut •-
in the general area at the time of the holdup. He testi-
fied as to receiving witness Frandson's radio broadcast, 
and to stopping a gold Duster automobile with square 
taillights (Record, p. 1 21-122) , a. t id Identified the 
occupants of the car to be defendants Lobato, Morgan and 
Dodge. He testified that appellant was seated in the 
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rear of the car (p. 122, In. 8) . He arrested each of the 
defendants. He testified as to recovering a purse from 
the right front floor (p. 138, In. 22 to p. 139, In. 6) 
containing approximately $580. The money was offered in 
evidence, but when counted amounted to $492 (p. 158, In. 
19-24). Witness Twitchell was later recalled to testify. 
He stated that there was no description broadcast on the 
radio dispatch of the second man (p. 167, In. 4-15), and 
that when appellant was arrested he did not have any 
glasses (p. 169, In. 7-10, 21-24) . He had earlier testi-
fied that defendant Morgan did not have glasses when he 
was arrested (p. 152, In. 21-23). Following his testimony, 
the money ($492) was offered in evidence and received over 
the objection by defense counsel that the variance in 
amount from that claimed in testimony by witnesses Twitchell 
($580) and Selvadge ($582) was substantial and critical, 
rendering the evidence irrelevant (p. 175, In. 16-30). 
The fifth witness was James Luff, a Salt Lake 
County Deputy Sheriff who was also at the scene of the 
arrest of defendants, arriving after they had been stopped 
by Officer Twitchell. He saw the money in the purse 
(Record, p. 161, In. 6-11), but did not offer any testimony 
which would connect appellant to the holdup. 
The sixth witness was Gayle Llewelyn, a customer 
in the Ming Restaurant during the commission of the holdup. 
She identified defendant Morgan as a man she saw walking 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
into a restaurant bathroom with gloves on, and observed a 
girl in the parking lot in a Duster automobile, that she 
could not identify. She stated that a Sherry Snyder was 
with her throughout the time in question, and that they 
followed Officer Frandson leaving the restaurant in their 
ar until he was overtaken and stopped, where Ms, Snyder 
gave a description to him. Witness Llewelyn testified 
that she did not sec
 ti second man (Record, p. 179, In, 
13-14) , nor did she give Officer Frandson a description 
of a second man (p. 18 0, In. 6-12; . •* ceseripti en at 
all (p. 182
 f In. 10-2). She did not. notice glasses worn 
by defendant Morgan (p. 181, ln„ 30 to p. 182, In. ±j . 
At the conelusi on of her t ,est imony, the state rested its 
case. 
A session was conducted o\ it c f the hearing" of the 
jury in chambers. Counsel for appellant renewed his motion 
for mistrial on the basis of misconduct by the prosecution 
- • " r.e 5scs ( Record , p , I H 7 -1 90 ) and a motion to dismiss 
•^ *:c appellant for lack of evidence (p„ 192-194) . Both 
motions were taken under advisement, and later denied 
(p 196) After a brief recall of witness Selvadge, who 
offered testimony describing the first man, the defense 
rested its case,, •' 
During closing arguments, the counsel for the 
prosecution summarized the testimony offpred in the casef 
claiming that witness Selvadge identified appellant 
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(Record, p. 199, In. 26-30), to which defense counsel 
objected to the claim (p. 200, In. 1-4) . At no time was 
any evidence introduced which identified appellant as 
having directly participated in the commission of the 
holdup, save the assertion by the prosecution in its 
opening statement that witness Selvadge would identify 
appellant (Record, p. 63, In. 2-5), which in fact never 
occurred. 
The jury found appellant guilty of Aggravated 
Robbery on the same day. On August 13, 1975, counsel for 
appellant submitted a motion for new trial or in the 
alternative for arrest of judgment on two grounds: (1) that 
it was error to deny the motion for mistrial as to the mis-
conduct of the witnesses in violation of the exclusion rule 
and the admonition of the witness; and (2) that the ver-
dict was contrary to the evidence. The motions were denied 
by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: IN THAT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY WAS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTfS 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-302 (1973) sets 
forth the elements which are essential to a showing of 
Aggravated Robbery: 
Aggravated Robbery.—(1) A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of com-
mitting robbery, he: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(a) Uses a firearm or a fascimile 
of a firearm, knife or a facsilime of a 
knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury 
upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of 
the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an 
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery "if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission off 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
A careful examination of the record below demonstrates 
that the evidence presented does not support a conviction of 
Aggravated Robbery, Appellant WHS not identified as being 
present at the scene of the alleged holdup. When the auto-
mobile was stopped by police with the three defendants 
inside, appellant was found not to be driving the car, not 
in possession of a firearm, knife or deadly weapon, and 
not in possession of the allegedly stolen property. He 
was not found to be wearing or in the possession of glasses. 
While the testimony was conflicting, none of the witnesses 
offered by prosecution were able to determine how many 
persons were in the ear as it left the restaurant, much 
less as to whether appellant was Inside., Wh ile one witness 
did testify circumstantially that there was a second man, 
her description of him did not fit appellant -or ^ r >ne 
able to identity appellant as the second man, although she 
stated that the second man stood immediately next to 
another man which she was able to identify. She was able 
to discern that this second man was not armed, in any 
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case. There was no showing of any serious bodily injury 
inflicted by appellant or the other defendants upon anyone. 
Thus there was no evidence with respect to appellant to 
tie him in except for his being in a vehicle after a 
robbery occurs which is stopped by the police with two 
other people who allegedly were involved in a holdup. 
While the evidence presented may have supported a showing 
of some other offense, it clearly does not show that 
appellant committed an aggravated robbery. 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 77-38-3(6) and 
77-34-1 (1953 as amended) set forth the grounds necessary 
for a person convicted of a criminal offense to have the 
conviction either set aside for new trial, or to have the 
judgment arrested. Appellant submits that, upon th€> 
evidence presented at trial, the elements for new trial 
or arrest of judgment were present sufficiently that is was 
error for the court not to grant appellant's motion. 
POINT II: IN THAT THE STATE'S WITNESSES COMMITTED 
MISCONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION 
RULE AND THE ADMONITION IMPOSED BY THE 
COURT, IT WAS ERROR TO DENY APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
There are two statutory provisions in Utah which 
concern the exclusion rule. The first is Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-7-4 (1953 as amended), which provides, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
Right to exclude in certain cases.— 
...; and in any cause the court may, in 
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its discretion, during the examination of 
a witness exclude any and all other witnesses 
in the cause. 
The second reference is found in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 43(f), on evidence, which provides: 
Exclusion of witnesses. Upon motion 
of either party, the court shall exclude 
from the courtroom any witness of the adverse 
party, not at the time under examination, so 
that he may not hear the testimony of the 
other witnesses. 
While there is some case law in Utah interpreting 
these provisions, it does not concern the question presented 
here on appeal. Thus a question of first impression is 
presented to this Court. 
To briefly review the facts of the case, the six 
prosecution witnesses were sworn in to testify jointly, 
and then were instructed by the court to (1) wait out-
side of the courtroom until called to testify, and (2) 
not discuss the case during the course of the trial. The 
witnesses did in fact discuss the case collectively outside 
the courtroom during a recess, as is evidenced by the 
record generally, and in the specific admission by some 
of the witnesses in testimony. The question presented is 
this, does this sort of witness misconduct warrant the 
granting of a new trial, or for arrest of judgment. 
The admonition of the witnesses not to discuss 
the case is an integral part of the exclusion rule. 
Without such an admonition, the purpose of the rule is 
frustrated. What is offensive in the present case is the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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repetition of testimony by one witness who had testified to 
the witnesses that were going to testify and the discussions 
between all of the prosecution witnesses, after being 
expressly admonished not to do so by the court. If the 
exclusionary rule has any meaning at allf it means that 
such discussions are forbidden and that witnesses do not 
compare their stories during the course of a trial. 
It is not possible to recite all of the details 
of the discussion between the witnesses, although some 
matters included in the conversation are revealed in the 
record. However, the very comparison of stories is 
suggestive in itself, and thus it should not be the burden 
of a criminal defendant to demonstrate the damage caused 
by the conversation. The proper test is whether it is 
likely that the misconduct had the effect of tainting the 
evidence such that it might not be possible to be afforded 
a fair trial. The burden is to show the likelihood of 
such an effect, and not the practically impossible burden 
of showing actual damage. 
In rebuttal to these arguments, the State has 
pointed out that the prosecution attorney was present 
during the discussion, and that the conversation occurred 
at his direction. This in turn somehow removes the likeli-
hood that the evidence will be tainted. Appellant would con-
tend that the position of the State is unfeasible. These 
arguments reveal that the prosecution actively participated 
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in conduct expressly forbidden in the court's admonition. 
For the exclusion rule to have a valid position in our 
criminal justice system, it should be interpreted to require 
discussions between counsel and witnesses be conducted 
singularly during the course of trial, such as to avoid 
the fabrication and/or collaboration of similar testimony. 
Any other interpretation will render the exclusion rule a 
nullity. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the lack of evidence showing that appellant 
committed aggravated robbery, it is submitted that his 
conviction should be reversed, and either a new trial 
granted or the judgment arrested. Due to the misconduct of 
the prosecution witnesses in the face of a direct admonition 
by the court not to engage in such conduct, it is submitted 
that appellant should be granted a new trial 
Respectfully submitted, 
" ^ . & S ^ 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney for Appellant 
-13-
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